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Over-education, under-education and credentialism in the Australian 
labour market 
Alfred Michael Dockery, Centre for Labour Market Research and Curtin Business 
School, Curtin University and Paul W Miller, Curtin Business School, Curtin 
University 
We know that, in general, the more years of education individuals acquire, the more money they are 
likely to earn. Recent responses from Australian governments to the demands for economic growth 
will see an increase in the proportion of workers holding educational qualifications, particularly 
higher-level qualifications. There is always a concern that there will not be enough jobs that require 
the proportionate level of education, and that the increase in those with higher-level qualifications 
will lead to credentialism rather than to a more skilled workforce. 
Using data from the 2006 Census of Population and Housing and the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, Dockery and Miller examine the issue of credentialism by 
comparing the reference or required level of education for occupations and the actual education level 
held by an individual. They employ the ‘ORU’ model, where O refers to over-education (having more 
years of education than is required for the job); R refers to the reference or required level of 
education for a particular job; and U refers to under-education (having fewer years of education 
relative to the reference level). The credentialism dimension is captured by looking at whether the 
level of over-education is greater among younger cohorts and the extent to which there is a wage 
penalty attached to this ‘over-education’.  
Key messages 
 Increasing education levels have given rise to a degree of credentialism, with young age cohorts 
having greater numbers who are over-educated relative to older cohorts.  
 But the degree of credentialism is quite modest: the (wage) return from years of over-education is 
6% compared with 9% for required years of education. 
 The penalty for credentialism is about the same as that attached to labour market mismatch, 
whereby, as part of the usual dynamics of the labour market, individuals are in jobs for which they 
are over-educated. 
While the authors find some evidence for credentialism, the results are somewhat reassuring for 
governments intent on improving education levels. While more members of younger cohorts with 
specific higher-level qualifications may end up in jobs not commensurate with their qualifications 
(relative to older cohorts), there is still a healthy return from the implied ‘over-education’.  
 
Tom Karmel 
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Abstract 
It is well established that workers with more years of education earn higher wages. By establishing a 
reference or ‘required’ level of education for a worker’s occupation, it is possible to decompose an 
individual’s actual level of education into years of required education and years of over-education or 
under-education relative to that occupational norm. A richer picture of wage determination can be 
gained by substituting these three terms for actual education in the standard Mincer wage equation. 
Relative to the standard estimates of returns from years of actual education, international and 
Australian studies using this ‘ORU model’ (over-education, required education, under-education) 
typically find larger returns from years of required education and modest returns from years of over-
education. Workers benefit from being employed in an occupation for which they are under-educated, 
because the positive effect of being in an occupation with a higher reference level of education 
outweighs the negative effect of their years of under-education. 
This report shows how the ORU model can be used to inform consideration of the wage implications of 
credentialism, defined as an increase over time in the education standards for specific jobs and which 
is not necessary for the effective achievement of tasks across positions in the labour market. Data 
from the 2006 Census of Population and Housing are used to establish the required (mean) level of 
education in each of 46 two-digit occupations for a sample of employees from waves 1 to 8 of the 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. Both standard ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and panel data models show that the estimated return from years of required education 
exceeds the return from years of surplus education. This result is robust to the augmentation of the 
ORU model with variables for the occupation of employment, and to estimation on separate samples 
of males and females. The years of educational attainment attributable to credentialism are 
associated with an increase in the hourly wage of the same order of magnitude as the years of over-
education in the standard ORU model. Under extreme versions of credentialism, where the level of 
education is used only to match individuals to jobs and where the skills that are valued in the labour 
market are only learned on the job, it would be expected that the credentialism wage effect would 
be zero. The fact that this return is not zero indicates that, even if the higher levels of schooling of 
our younger cohorts are not needed for them to be assigned to jobs, the skills learned at school are 
valued in the labour market. 
There are two key policy messages from this research. The first is that the additional years of 
schooling associated with credentialism are not wasted: these additional years appear to be linked 
to the development of skills that attract a reward of around 3—6%. This is comforting for 
advocates of the expansion of the education sector. Second, there are large gains that could be 
potentially achieved through a better matching of workers’ actual educational attainment to job 
requirements.   
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Introduction 
The relationship between the years of education an individual has accrued and their wage rate is one 
of the most studied relationships in labour economics. An extensive international body of empirical 
evidence is highly consistent in finding a positive and sizeable wage premium associated with each 
additional year of education attained. For Australia, estimation of a standard Mincer earnings 
equation reveals that each year of education is associated with roughly a 10% higher wage rate, a 
figure not dissimilar to that found in many other advanced economies. It is important to note, 
however, that for a number of reasons this cannot be taken to represent the causal effect of 
education on earnings.  
There is also evidence from a growing international literature that individuals receive a lower return 
from years of education that are in excess of the requirements for the occupation in which they work. 
This is typically established by identifying a ‘reference level’ of education for each occupation and 
decomposing workers’ own years of education into the reference (or ‘required’) level for the 
occupation they work in, and their shortfall or surplus relative to that reference level. Those with 
fewer years of education relative to the reference level are termed ‘under-educated’ and those with 
more years of education than the reference level are termed ‘over-educated’. Then, separate 
variables for years of over-education (O), years of reference or required education (R) and years of 
under-education (U) are included in the earnings equation in place of the conventional single years of 
schooling variable. This is termed the ORU model. 
When compared with standard estimates of the return from years of education, this ORU approach 
typically finds higher returns from reference years of education, quite modest returns from years of 
surplus education, while, for under-educated workers, the positive effect of being in an occupation 
with a higher reference level of education outweighs the negative effect of their years of under-
education. The first study to apply the standard ORU approach to Australian data (Voon & Miller 2005) 
confirmed these findings. 
Thus the over-education and under-education approach provides a much richer picture of the returns 
from years of education in the labour market and has appeal, in that it links demand-side 
considerations into the typical supply-oriented human capital approach to earnings determination. 
From a social policy perspective, this has important implications for the net benefit of additional 
years of education, once foregone earnings and the direct costs of education are taken into account, 
and for the importance of efficiently matching the supply and demand sides of the labour market 
according to job requirements and workers’ skill levels. It also has potentially important implications 
for recent policy initiatives in Australia, which have sought to increase mandatory levels of schooling 
and which may be seen as one component of a more general issue of credentialism. 
The issue of credentialism has quite broad intellectual roots. It is associated with education being an 
indicator of social class rather than a means of skill development (Evans & Kelley 2001). In the 
modern economics literature it is usually linked to education being used as a signalling device (Spence 
1973). In this situation, levels of education emerge as indicators, or signals, of innate ability rather 
than reflecting human capital developed through the education system. Credentialism is often viewed 
as synonymous with an over-time and unnecessary increase in the education standards required for 
the effective achievement of jobs. This is the practical implication of credentialism, which is tested 
below using a framework based on the ORU model. 
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However, there are some important limitations to the over-education and under-education approach. 
Firstly, it is possible that those who are employed in jobs where there is a significant mismatch 
between their own level of education and that of the typical worker in that occupation have 
systematically different attributes, which may be unobservable to the researcher. Those who secure 
jobs when they have less than the ‘reference’ level of education may have other attributes that 
positively impact upon their productivity, such as a strong career focus or greater confidence. On the 
other hand, those who accept jobs for which they are overqualified may have attributes that 
negatively affect their productivity. The over-qualified could also simply be engaged in longer-term 
planning, with some arguing that the over-qualified are perhaps engaged in the accumulation of ‘on-
the-job’ skills that will lead to future job success. These ‘unobservables’ can be controlled for if the 
analyst has panel data — sufficient repeat observations on the same individuals over time and in 
different jobs. A second limitation is that the reference level of education is often defined as the 
average years of education observed for each occupation, and an increase in credentialism will be 
reflected in the models as an increase in the reference level of education and in patterns of under-
education and over-education that vary by age but which may not accurately portray the true extent 
of these phenomena. 
This study presents evidence on the sensitivity of the findings from the over-education and under-
education approach to estimation, using panel data to control for unobserved heterogeneity among 
individuals as well as incorporating estimates of the role of credentialism. The chapter following the 
literature review provides a descriptive overview of key variables. This includes the construction of 
the reference or required level of education by occupation, based on 2006 census data and patterns in 
over- and under-education gleaned from longitudinal data from the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia Survey. The next chapter presents the results from models comparing the 
standard Mincer wage equation with those from wage equations employing the ORU approach using 
cross-sectional and panel techniques. The results imply that much of the difference in the estimated 
effects of years of under-education, years of required education and years of over-education observed 
in cross-section models can actually be attributed to fixed and unobserved individual effects. These 
findings are consistent with the handful of previous studies that have applied panel techniques to the 
ORU model. 
The next chapter uses the ORU framework to investigate the role of ‘credentialism’, the gradual 
increases in education levels over time that are unrelated to changes in actual job requirements. This 
may apply if employers use years of education as a screening device to allocate workers to jobs, or 
through the use of the job competition model conceived by Thurow (1975), in which individuals 
compete for jobs rather than for wages. Evidence is found that credentialism — defined, for the 
purposes of inclusion in the earnings equation, as years of education for younger workers above the 
occupational norm for older workers — results in the same modest increases in pay that are linked to 
years of over-education among the older workers. In other words, credentialism can be argued to 
contribute to over-education, as the educational mismatch arising from this source does not appear to 
have any inherently different effects on wages when compared with the mismatch arising from other 
sources.  
Several tests of the sensitivity of the findings are presented. First, occupation-specific wage effects 
are taken into account in the ORU model. This is important, as the variation in required levels of 
education in the ORU model could reflect other general characteristics of the occupation (for 
example, short-run skill shortages) rather than skill requirements. The addition to the earnings 
equation of dummy variables for the broad occupational group of employment accounts for only a 
very small proportion of the variation in wages unexplained by the original sets of explanatory 
10 Over-education, under-education and credentialism in the Australian labour market 
variables and results in only modest changes to the estimated partial effects in both the conventional 
Mincerian model and the ORU model. Second, the analyses are undertaken on separate samples of 
males and females. Similar findings in relation to the wage effects of under-education, over-
education and required education are established for each gender group. However, positive returns 
from credentialism appear to be concentrated among females, a finding that is likely to reflect an 
added value from the signalling of innate ability as female employment has become less segregated 
by occupation since the 1970s, and hence is not applicable to males. These tests show that the 
findings in relation to the ORU model terms, and to some degree the credentialism term introduced in 
this research, are robust to the range of specification issues considered. 
The concluding chapter discusses some of the implications of the analysis for theory, policy and for 
future research. 
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Background and literature review 
Labour is a key ingredient in all of the various production processes that generate goods and services 
in the economy. The organisation of that labour, however, is infinitely more complex than that 
portrayed in the model found in introductory economics texts, in which labour is a homogenous input 
into a single production function, receiving in recompense wages equal to the value of its marginal 
product. Rather, workers need to be allocated to jobs, which are in turn organised around the 
idiosyncratic requirements of the relevant factor and product markets, the physical capital and 
technology used, and the structure of the firm, along with many other factors. Performing in these 
different jobs requires a wide variety of different combinations of general skills and knowledge, and 
of skills and knowledge that are specific to the particular firm, industry and technology used. Some 
skills and knowledge may be most efficiently accrued through work experience and others through 
school, post-school vocational education and higher education. An occupation is a categorisation of 
jobs that require similar sets of knowledge and skills and involve the performance of similar tasks. 
Human capital theory assumes that a worker’s productivity, and hence wage, increases with years of 
education. For the vast bulk of the workforce, however, realising that higher productive and earnings 
capacity is mediated though the processes of job formation and the allocation of workers to those 
jobs. Completing educational qualifications signals to employers the capacity to perform more 
difficult or complex jobs and increases a person’s chances of being allocated to a job carrying a 
higher wage. Thus the wage can be seen as being a characteristic of either the job or the worker. 
Evidently, both views apply to some degree. On the one hand, even within the same firm, promotions 
and bonuses generate performance-based differences in earnings between workers in the same 
occupation. On the other hand, a highly paid medical specialist would not earn as much working as a 
cleaner. There are both individual and occupation-specific effects at play in determining wages.  
Which effect dominates has important implications for the role of education. If there existed a known 
continuum of jobs ranging from ‘low productivity’ to ‘high productivity’ and workers could be 
similarly placed on a continuum measuring their suitability to perform higher-productivity jobs, and 
the labour market perfectly matched workers to jobs with a one-to-one correlation between the two 
hierarchies, then the two views would be indistinguishable. For a host of reasons, imperfect 
information, search costs and labour immobility among them, matching in the real labour market is 
not so clinical. Occupation, wages and educational attainment provide only very coarse signals of the 
positions of jobs and workers in the respective hierarchies. Educational attainment plays the dual role 
of increasing workers’ actual capacity to perform higher-productivity jobs and of signalling to 
employers their position on the continuum. So while earnings increase with educational attainment, 
empirically it is very difficult to disentangle the impact of education on workers’ actual productivity 
from the signalling effect that increases their likelihood of securing a higher-paid job. 
If productivity and earnings are directly linked to the level of educational attainment of individuals, 
then we should observe a positive relationship between earnings and education, irrespective of 
occupation. If, on the other hand, productivity is primarily a characteristic of the job, then within 
occupations persons with relatively high levels of education should earn no more than persons in the 
same occupation with relatively low levels of education. In an approach attributed to Duncan and 
Hoffman (1981), these hypotheses have been tested empirically by distinguishing between the years 
of required education for an individual’s occupation and the actual years of education accrued by the 
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individual.1 This allows estimation of the returns (or wage effects) associated with years of under-
education, required education and over-education, or ORU. 
Hartog (2000) provides a review of empirical findings from the ORU approach and a discussion of 
methodological issues.2 He identifies four key findings from this literature (2000, p.135): 
 The return from required years of education is higher than that obtained from the standard Mincer 
wage equation, a finding that has been confirmed in studies based on data from the United States, 
Portugal, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
 Returns from years of over-education are positive but smaller than for years of required education. 
 Returns from years of under-education are negative but always smaller in absolute value than the 
returns from required education. Hence under-educated workers receive higher wages than their 
counterparts with the same level of education but in correctly matched occupations. 
 These findings are robust to different methods of measuring the required education for an 
occupation, including job content analysis (in theory, the best approach, but also the most 
onerous for data collection), worker self-assessment and realised matches. Chiswick and Miller 
(2010a) have provided more recent evidence based on data from the United States, that the same 
general findings are obtained when required education is determined using realised matches or 
worker self-assessment. Similarly, Chiswick and Miller (2010b) apply the realised matches and job 
content analysis methods in a study of data for Australia and arrive at the same conclusion. 
The results from the first study to follow the standard ORU approach using Australian data, Voon and 
Miller (2005), largely conform to these findings. Using 1996 census data for full-time workers, Voon 
and Miller decompose individuals’ years of actual education into separate terms for their occupation’s 
required years of education and their years of over- or under-education. The ‘realised match’ 
approach is used to define required education — basing the reference level of education on the 
average years of education of persons observed to be working in that occupation. They estimate 
around a 17% increase in earnings for each year of required education, much higher than the 9% 
return obtained for actual years of education using a standard Mincer wage equation for the same 
sample. By comparison, each year of over-education results in an increase in wages of just 6.3%. 
Individuals are also estimated to receive high returns from securing employment in an occupation for 
which the reference years of education exceed their actual years of education — about 13.7% for each 
year of under-education, comprised of the 17.1% gain per extra year of required education less a 
penalty of 3.4% for each year of under-education. Controlling for the incidence of over- and under-
education is found to increase the estimated gender wage gap by around three percentage points: 
women receive lower returns from years of required education than do men. 
Other ORU studies using Australian data include Kler (2005, 2006a, 2006b), Linsley (2005), Fleming 
and Kler (2005), Chiswick and Miller (2006, 2010b), Messinis and Olekalns (2006) and Green, Kler and 
Leeves (2007). These studies use the over-education and under-education framework to examine 
specific aspects of the labour market, such as the roles of birthplace and language skills, visa class 
and the lack of recognition of qualifications obtained abroad among immigrants, and whether training 
                                                   
1 While the early literature opted for the term ‘required’ to describe the educational norm for an occupation, in recent 
studies the terms ‘usual’ or ‘reference’ have been preferred in recognition of the fact that workers are frequently 
employed with levels of education that diverge from the occupational norm, making the term ‘required’ something of 
a misnomer. 
2 Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) provide a more recent review, though this covers only one study for Australia. 
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is useful in bridging the gap between actual and required education levels. These applications show 
that the framework provides a powerful tool for labour market analysis. 
Two other Australian studies, Mavromaras, McGuinness and Fok (2009a, 2009b) and Mavromaras, 
McGuinness, O’Leary, Sloane and Wei (2010), use the HILDA data to analyse overskilling in the 
Australian labour market, based on workers’ self-assessment of the degree to which their skills are 
fully utilised in their jobs, in contrast to over-education. They do not consider underskilling, since 
there is no comparable question in the survey by which to construct such a concept. Mavromaras, 
McGuinness and Fok (2009a) find that workers with certificate level III or IV vocational qualifications 
are the least likely to experience mismatch of the form of ‘overskilling’. Perhaps perversely, workers 
with the lowest level of vocational qualifications are the most likely to report underutilisation of their 
skills. Akin to existing ORU results, Mavromaras, McGuinness and Fok (2009a, 2009b) find a wage 
penalty associated with being overskilled, relative to correctly matched workers. 
Mavromaras et al. (2010) interact the definition of overskilling from the HILDA Survey with over-
education, based on the realised match approach (using the occupational mode) from the same 
dataset. This generates four categories of workers: correctly matched; over-educated only; 
overskilled only; and both overskilled and over-educated. As with Mavromaras, McGuinness and Fok 
(2009a, 2009b), they do not consider underskilling or under-education; however, they do consider job 
satisfaction as an outcome variable in addition to wages. They find that overskilling and over-
education are distinct phenomena; and that wage penalties are greatest for those who are both 
overskilled and over-educated. Job satisfaction, on the other hand, appears only to be reduced in the 
presence of overskilling. Of particular significance for this current paper, Mavromaras et al. (2010) 
utilise the longitudinal nature of the HILDA data to estimate panel models that control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, and this strongly reduces the estimated impacts of overskilling and over-education on 
wages. These findings mirror two other studies to have utilised panel data in estimating the effects of 
over-education, Bauer (2002) and Tsai (2010), which also find that unobserved individual effects 
account for much of the apparent wage penalty associated with over-education observed in cross-
sectional data. 
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Over- and under-education in 
Australia: some descriptive data 
The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey is a household panel survey in which 
respondents are tracked and interviewed each year. The panel was established through a random 
sample of private households in Australia, and within those households all persons aged 15 and over 
are interviewed. The bulk of interviews are conducted between September and December each year 
and, as at the commencement of this analysis, data from eight waves, spanning 2001 to 2008, were 
available. Around 13 000 individuals from over 7000 households responded in each year, with year-on-
year attrition rates averaging below 10%. (See <http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/hilda/ for 
further details on the survey>.)  
For the purposes of this analysis the sample is restricted to employed persons who: 
 are employees (as opposed to employers, self-employed or unpaid family helpers) 
 are aged 15 to 64 years 
 were not still at school 
 usually worked between 0 and 112 hours per week (to remove outliers) 
 did not have a long-term health condition that limited the amount of work they can do. 
This results in a total sample of 40 644 person-year observations across the eight waves, or around 
5000 observations per wave. 
To establish the benchmarks for the reference level of education in each occupation, data from the 
2006 census were accessed via the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (ABS) CData Online facility. These 
data provide a basis for applying a realised matches approach, which appears to be the only practical 
method, given that the main objective of this study is to assess the impact of credentialism, which 
requires establishing reference levels of education for various age cohorts. Tables of the highest level 
of schooling completed by highest level of non-school qualification were extracted for each two-digit 
occupation. For completion of Year 8 through to completion of Year 12, eight through to 12 years of 
education (or schooling) are assumed, respectively. For those who reported ‘did not go to school’, 
completion of seven years of primary school is assumed. The results are unlikely to be sensitive to 
this last assumption as it applies to less than one per cent of individuals. Table 1 shows the 
assumptions regarding the years of education associated with the categories of highest level of non-
school qualification. 
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Table 1 Assumed years of (post-school) education for each level of non-school qualification reported 
Census category for level of education: non-school qualification Assumed years of education 
‘Not applicable’ 0 
Certificate level I/II, ‘Certificate level nfd' 0.5 
Certificate level III/IV 1 
Diploma and ‘Advanced diploma and diploma level nfd’ 1.5 
Advanced diploma/associate degree 2 
Bachelor degree 3.5 
Graduate certificate, graduate diploma and ‘graduate diploma and graduate 
certificate nfd’  
4 
Master degree and ‘Postgraduate degree nfd.’ 5 
Doctoral degree 8 
The table of years of schooling by highest level of post-school education is in the form of a six by nine 
matrix (years of schooling by highest level of non-school qualification), with each cell representing a 
different level of schooling, defined as the sum of the years of schooling and the assumed years of 
education associated with the highest level of non-school education. For each two-digit occupation, 
populating the matrix by the number of individuals in each cell allows the average years of education 
to be derived by occupation. The estimates at the major (one-digit) occupation level are shown in the 
middle columns of table 2. It is possible to use much the same assignment rules to the schooling and 
educational attainment variables available in HILDA. (Note, however, the sample used in the 
calculations based on HILDA have been restricted, as set out above.) These are shown in the right-
hand columns of table 2. It can be seen that there is a very close concordance between the census 
and HILDA-based means and standard deviations. The one notable disagreement is the average years 
of education for managers, for which the estimate based on the HILDA data, at 13.42 years, is notably 
higher than the census estimate (12.66 years). Most of this difference lies in the higher estimate of 
post-school education for managers identified in HILDA (1.99 years versus 1.44 years in the census). 
This is likely to be a result of the HILDA sample being restricted to employees only, for the purposes 
of the modelling. The census data, on the other hand, will include others describing themselves as 
managers, including employers and the self-employed. 
Table 2 Average years of education by major occupation category, 2006 census and HILDA 
 Census 2006 HILDA  
(waves 1–8) 
 Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. 
Managers 12.66 2.40 13.42 2.32 
Professionals 14.77 2.02 14.86 1.94 
Technicians and trades workers 11.70 1.57 11.78 1.56 
Community and personal service workers 12.08 1.82 12.09 1.74 
Clerical and administrative workers 12.13 1.94 12.16 1.89 
Sales workers 11.63 1.73 11.87 1.67 
Machinery operators and drivers 10.88 1.66 10.81 1.54 
Labourers 10.88 1.74 10.96 1.74 
Total (employed) 12.41 2.31 12.68 2.32 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2006 census data accessed through CData Online (see 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/CDATAOnline>) and HILDA waves 1–8. 
The close concordance between the means in the 2006 census and the HILDA data suggest that similar 
results would be obtained regardless of which dataset was used to determine the reference level of 
education. The census data are preferred in this instance as, when the more detailed two-digit 
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occupational categorisation is used, the larger numbers in the population-based census data ensure 
more accurate measures than can be obtained from the sample-based HILDA data. The means and 
standard deviations derived from the census data by gender and at the more detailed two-digit 
occupation level can be found in appendix table A1. 
To explore the extent of under- and over-education, persons are defined as being correctly matched 
to their occupation if their own years of education are within plus or minus one standard deviation of 
the mean for their occupation, with both the reference mean and standard deviation taken from the 
census and calculated at the two-digit level (see table A1). The very small number of persons with 
occupations classified at the major level but as ‘not fully defined’ at the two-digit level (such as ‘20 
Professionals not fully defined’) were not included in the analysis, although technically they could be, 
as a mean and standard deviation can be calculated for such categories from the census. Persons are 
considered to be under-educated if they have years of education more than one standard deviation 
below their occupation’s mean, and over-educated if they have years of education more than one 
standard deviation above their occupation’s mean. 
For the pooled sample in total, just under three-quarters (72.2%) are classified as correctly matched, 
with the remaining one-quarter split roughly evenly between the under- and over-educated 
categories. The result is not greatly sensitive to the level of occupation at which the analysis is done. 
If the means and standard deviations are calculated only for the eight major occupational groups, 
instead of the 43 two-digit groups, around 68% are classified as correctly matched. Table 3 shows the 
breakdown by gender and wave. It can be seen that, relative to females, males are more likely to be 
over-educated and, correspondingly, less likely to be under-educated. For both genders there is a 
trend of declining incidence of under-education and growing incidence of over-education in the HILDA 
sample between 2001 and 2008, possibly due to rising overall educational attainment or to a lower 
rate of attrition among more educated persons. 
Table 3 Employees under-educated, correctly matched and over-educated, 2001 (wave 1) to 2008 
(wave 8), by gender (%) 













Wave 1 20.1 70.4 9.5 17.7 70.6 11.7 
Wave 2 18.0 71.9 10.1 15.6 71.8 12.6 
Wave 3 17.1 72.0 10.8 15.6 71.4 13.0 
Wave 4 16.5 72.6 10.9 14.8 71.8 13.4 
Wave 5 15.7 71.5 12.8 14.0 72.7 13.3 
Wave 6 15.0 72.5 12.5 14.0 72.6 13.4 
Wave 7 14.9 73.8 11.3 14.0 73.0 13.0 
Wave 8 14.1 73.9 12.0 14.1 72.4 13.4 
Total (Waves 1–8) 16.5 72.3 11.2 15.0 72.0 13.0 
Table 4 reports the proportion of workers within each occupation by over- and under-education 
status. Managers show the lowest proportion of correctly matched workers and in particular a high 
proportion of over-educated workers among both male and female managers. Professionals are very 
unlikely to be over-educated, and this holds most strongly for women. There are some noticeable 
differences between males and females within the occupation categories. Women who work as 
‘technicians and trades workers’ are far more likely to be over-educated than their male 
counterparts, while men who work as ‘sales workers’ and to a lesser extent ‘clerical and 
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administrative workers’ are much less likely to be under-educated than their female counterparts. In 
part this may reflect differences in the occupations at the lower levels of aggregation in the two-digit 
categories in which men and women are concentrated. Appendix table A2 shows the incidence of 
over- and under-education at the more detailed two-digit occupation level. 
Table 4 Employees under-educated, correctly matched and over-educated, by occupation (pooled 
sample) (%) 













Managers 16.8 62.6 20.6 16.4 63.9 19.7 
Professionals 18.5 76.9 4.6 20.5 70.8 8.7 
Techs and trades 13.3 67.8 19.0 13.0 74.2 12.8 
Community and pers. 
service workers 
14.2 73.8 12.0 10.8 75.5 13.7 
Clerical and admin. 18.5 67.7 13.9 11.5 70.8 17.7 
Sales workers 10.7 77.5 11.8 5.5 79.3 15.1 
Machine operators 
and drivers 
11.7 77.5 10.8 17.9 74.1 8.0 
Labourers 17.6 70.9 11.5 14.5 72.6 12.8 
Total 16.5 72.3 11.2 15.0 72.0 12.9 
It is also of interest to see whether the state of being under- or over-educated tends to be a relatively 
transient or persistent one. To investigate this, transitions between the states were calculated over 
one-year periods and over the full eight years for which the HILDA data are available. The top half of 
table 5 shows the transition matrix for the employed observed in any one year and the immediately 
following year. It can be seen from the small percentages in the off-diagonal cells that there is 
relatively little movement between the states in a single year. Ninety per cent of individuals are in 
the same state the following year, and no movement is observed from over-education to under-
education, or vice versa. Even over the longer period of eight years, the matrix shows surprisingly 
little increase in transition probabilities. Of those observed as employees in both waves 1 and 8, 83% 
are classified in the same educational state, and still almost no movement between the over-
educated category and under-educated category is observed. Of those who were classed as under-
educated (over-educated) in wave 1, for example, 72.5% (68.7%) are classified in that same state in 
wave 8. As an alternative indicator, if the years of mismatch are calculated as a continuous variable 
(actual education minus the occupation mean), the correlation coefficient calculated from one year 
to the next is 0.90, declining to 0.83 after seven years. Educational mismatch, therefore, seems to be 
a highly persistent labour market state. 
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Table 5 One-year and eight-year transitions between under-educated, correctly matched and over-
educated states, HILDA 
  State one year later (n = 25 904) 







Initial state Under-educated 13.1 2.4 0.0 15.4 
Correctly matched 2.3 67.6 2.6 72.6 
Over-educated 0.0 2.4 9.6 12.0 
 Total 15.4 72.4 12.2 100.0 
  State in wave 8 (n = 2 365) 









Under-educated 12.6 4.6 0.2 17.4 
Correctly matched 3.3 63.4 5.4 72.1 
Over-educated 0.0 3.3 7.2 10.5 
 Total 15.9 71.2 12.8 100.0 
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Wage equations with panel data 
The HILDA data present two main alternatives for measuring the wages of employed persons. 
Respondents are asked a series of questions about their pay (most recent and usual pay) and they also 
report how many hours they work per week. From this, both weekly wages and an hourly wage rate 
can be derived. As an earnings measure, weekly wages suffer from the lack of comparability between 
people who work differing numbers of hours per week. Derived hourly wage rates, on the other hand, 
are subject to a further source of reporting error, as they must be based on the individual’s estimate 
of their usual working hours as well as their estimate of pay. One option is to limit the sample to full-
time workers and use usual weekly earnings as the wage measure. The main reason this approach is 
not followed here is that it would mean rejecting a very large proportion of female workers. Instead, 
the analysis reported below is based on real hourly wages, derived as usual weekly wages before tax, 
divided by usual weekly hours worked. As the bulk of surveying for HILDA is undertaken during the 
December quarter of each year, the nominal hourly wage figure is deflated by the CPI index for 
December in each wave to give a real wage in ‘December-quarter 2001 dollars’. 
To estimate the relationship between years of education and earnings, a standard Mincer wage 
equation takes the form: 
 
iiii SXY µγβα +++=ln    (Equation 1) 
where the subscript i denotes individuals, ln Yi is the log of earnings, Xi is a vector of variables other 
than schooling known to impact upon earnings and Si is the number of years of education the worker 
has undertaken. The constant term, α, the vector of coefficients, β, and the return from years of 
schooling, γ, are parameters to be estimated by ordinary least squares, and µi is a standard error term. 
A reasonably rich specification of the vector X is considered, with variables for age (five dichotomous 
variables for five-year and ten-year age brackets), marital status (three dichotomous variables), 
disability status (one dichotomous variable), part-time work (one dichotomous variable), English 
proficiency (two dichotomous variables), and work experience (a quadratic specification of a 
continuous variable) included in the estimating equation. This follows other recent studies that have 
used the HILDA data, such as Mavromaras, McGuinness and Fok (2009b) and Cai and Waddoups (2011).  
There are a number of features of this model that could limit its usefulness, the four major ones 
being functional form, omitted variables, measurement errors, and the potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. 
First, the model is additive in the right-hand-side variables. Mincer (1974) considered various 
interaction terms, although these more general models typically do not enhance the explanatory 
power of the earnings equation, and the estimates become cumbersome to interpret. 
Second, the model does not include a measure of ability, thereby inviting speculation over the 
accuracy of the estimates of the coefficients of other variables correlated with ability, and 
particularly the schooling coefficients. Both Griliches (1977) and Card (1999) conclude from their 
surveys that the ability bias in the estimated schooling coefficient is small, and the ‘return to 
education in a given population is not much below the estimate that emerges from a simple cross-
sectional regression of earnings on education’ (Card 1999, p.1855).  
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Third, as the data are self-reported, there is the potential for reporting/recall errors to lead to 
mismeasurement of the variables in the model. Of particular concern is the schooling variable. 
Measurement error is typically linked to a downward bias in the estimated return from schooling of 
around 10%, which is argued to approximately offset the upward omitted variables ability bias 
(Card 1999). 
Fourth, we follow Mincer (1974) and use a measure of work experience in the model, although, unlike 
Mincer, we also include variables for the worker’s age. This is similar to other recent studies using the 
HILDA database, such as Mavromaras, McGuinness and Fok (2009b) and Cai and Waddoups (2011). 
Mincer’s (1974) work experience variables were included in the earnings equation to capture post-
school investments via on-the-job training. Work experience, along with other elements of the vector 
X, could be endogenous. The theoretical response to this is to consider an instrumental variables 
estimator. This alternative estimator is not considered here due to a lack of variables in the dataset 
that would be suitable instruments (for schooling, experience, marital status, language proficiency, 
occupation), and the general disquiet in the literature over the sensitivity of the instrumental 
variables results (see, for example, Levin & Plug 1999). For discussion on the relative merits of age 
and work experience in the earnings equation, see Blinder (1976). 
Following the existing literature (Hartog 2000; Voon & Miller 2005), years of education are further 
decomposed into years of under-education (SU), required education (SR) and over-education (SO), where 
required education is defined as the mean years of education in a worker’s occupation, as calculated 
















































iRii SSSXY µγγγβα +++++=ln    (Equation 3) 
where γR, γO and γU are the estimated returns from years of required education, years of over-
education and years of under-education, respectively. The potential limitations of the Mincer model 
(Equation 1) carry over to this ORU model.3 In addition, it is noted that the required level of 
education for each occupation is assumed to be the same for all workers in the occupation, regardless 
of their age, birthplace or gender. This assumption is standard in the literature and appears to follow 
from the research using the job content approach to assessing the required level of education for 
each occupation, where a single standard is used. 
Initially the data are treated simply as pooled independent observations and take no account of the 
fact that there are repeated observations on the same workers, other than adjustment for the 
standard errors within ‘clusters’ (individuals). Average nominal wages grew quite strongly over the 
period from 2001 to 2008, and while the dependent variable is real wages, allowance is further made 
for wave-specific effects that might arise through changes in aggregate labour market conditions and 
                                                   
3 The measurement error issue could be more acute in the ORU model, as there are multiple schooling variables that may 
be mismeasured. While assessment of this with multiple measures of over-education appears to attest to the gravity of 
the potential problem (Leuven & Oosterbeek 2011), there are no systematic patterns in the estimates across the 
alternative methods for assessing education—occupation mismatch (the objective job content analysis, the subjective 
worker self-assessment and the realised matches procedure) that would lend support to this argument.   
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trends in real wage growth. Virtually identical results are obtained when individual dummy variables 
are included for each wave and when a continuous wave (or time) variable is used instead. Hence the 
latter more parsimonious specification is adopted. 
The results from the estimation of the standard wage equation with a time trend (Equation 1) are 
presented in table 6 (Model 1). As the dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly real wage, 
the coefficients can be taken as an approximation of the percentage effect on real wages. The 
coefficient of 0.02 on the wave variable implies real wage growth of around 2% per annum over this 
period. Males are estimated to earn 11% higher hourly wages than females. Wages follow a parabolic 
or inverted-U relationship with age. The pure age effect reaches a maximum for workers between the 
ages of 25 and 34 years; however, this must be considered in conjunction with the effect of work 
experience. Wages increase with years of experience in the workforce, but at a declining rate. Taking 
the effects of age and experience together, the wages of a person who works continually from age 21 
would peak in their early 50s. Married persons display higher wages, while those with a long-term 
health condition, disability or impairment earn around 4% less per hour.4 People who speak a language 
other than English as their main language at home and rate their English ability as poor or ‘no English 
at all’ face a wage penalty of around 28%. These results are all broadly consistent with existing 
estimates of wage determination in Australia.5 
Turning to the main parameter of interest, the coefficient on years of education of 0.07 implies an 
increase in hourly earnings of 7% per additional year of schooling or post-school education. This 
estimate is comparable with results in Australian studies, which use hourly wages as the dependent 
variable or which limit their focus to full-time workers. Studies based on weekly or annual earnings 
often report a higher return from schooling, as they also capture labour supply responses that vary by 
level of education. 
  
                                                   
4 Recall that the sample restrictions mean that this health condition, disability or impairment does not limit the amount 
of work they can do. 
5 While the sample has been restricted to persons who report usually working 1—112 hours, no further removal of 
outliers based on the value of the hourly wage has been applied. MacDonald and Robinson (1985, p.133) suggest that 
retaining all observations is preferable to arbitrary truncation rules. 
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Table 6 Wage equation estimates, HILDA, 2001—08 
Variable Standard wage 
equation 









 Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|t| 
Intercept 1.65 0.000 1.09 0.000 1.22 0.000 1.32 0.000 
Wave 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.00 0.879 
















20–24 -0.02 0.167 0.00 0.877 0.01 0.579   
25–34 0.03 0.006 0.04 0.000 0.03 0.000   
35–44 —  —  —    
45–54 -0.06 0.000 -0.07 0.000 -0.04 0.000   












Never married -0.10 0.000 -0.09 0.000 -0.07 0.000 -0.06 0.000 
Separated -0.04 0.000 -0.03 0.000 -0.02 0.009 0.00 0.886 
Widow -0.05 0.001 -0.05 0.001 -0.04 0.000 -0.02 0.176 
Has disability -0.04 0.000 -0.03 0.000 -0.01 0.065 0.00 0.854 












2nd language &: 

















English poor/none -0.28 0.000 -0.21 0.000 -0.17 0.000 -0.10 0.048 
Work experience (yrs) 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.03 0.000 0.07 0.000 
Work exp. squared/1000 -0.26 0.000 -0.26 0.000 -0.39 0.000 -0.79 0.000 






      
Required    0.12 0.000 0.10 0.000 0.06 0.000 
Over-education   0.05 0.000 0.05 0.000 0.03 0.000 
Under-education   -0.04 0.000 -0.06 0.000 -0.04 0.000 
         
Obs 39 812  39 783  39 783  39 783  
Individuals 10 703  10 698  10 698  10 698  
Obs/indiv. 3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  
R-squared 0.30  0.32  0.31  0.16  
R-sq: within     0.10  0.10  
between     0.35  0.19  
F value 408 0.000 395 0.000   141 0.000 
Wald chi2     6 636 0.000   
Notes: All models estimated in STATA using XTREG with robust standard errors. Clustering is at the level of the individual. 
Model 2 presents the results of the same model, but with years of education now decomposed into 
years of required education, under-education and over-education. This change to the model 
specification has little impact on the estimated effects associated with the non-schooling explanatory 
variables. At 12%, the estimated return from years of required education is significantly higher than 
the 7% return from actual years of education. However, there is a much lower return of 5% from years 
of education in excess of that required for an individual’s occupation. In this sense, persons working 
in occupations requiring less education than they possess face an opportunity cost from not being 
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employed in an occupation matching their educational attainment. Each year of under-education is 
associated with a 4% reduction in wages. This in fact implies that under-educated workers are better 
off than they would be if they were correctly matched. Take, for example, a worker who has one year 
of education less than the required level for the occupation in which s/he is employed. This worker is 
estimated to receive 8% higher wages than s/he would if employed in an occupation correctly 
matched to his/her years of education: 12% higher wages for the additional year of required 
education less 4% for his/her year of under-education. 
Voon and Miller’s (2005) estimates, based on the earnings of full-time workers as reported in the 1996 
census, show a similar premium for each year of actual education: 9% compared with this current 
estimate of 7%. However, using the ORU approach, they find a much larger return from required years 
of education (17% as opposed to 12% here), and roughly similar returns from years of over-education 
(6.3% as opposed to 5.1%) and years of under-education (-3.4% compared with -4.0%). The lower 
return from years of required education in the current study relative to Voon and Miller’s (2005) 
estimate for full-time workers may reflect the fact that, among full-time workers, working hours tend 
to be longer in occupations with higher educational requirements, thus reducing the wage premium 
calculated on an hourly basis. Also, Chiswick and Miller (2010b) report a return from required 
education of around 15% in their analysis of 2001 census data. Thus there could be a pattern of 
decline over time in this particular payoff. 
Models 3 and 4 of table 6 test the robustness of these results to estimation using panel models that 
take into account the fact that the data consist of repeat observations on the same individuals. The 
39 783 observations available for the estimation of the over- and under-education models actually 
comprise observations on 10 698 individuals. On average, each individual contributed 3.7 
observations, with a minimum of one and a maximum of eight observations for any one individual. The 
results do not vary greatly when estimated using the random-effects model. However, results from 
the fixed-effects model suggest a much lower return from years of required education.6 Importantly, 
the fixed-effects specification results in a much smaller difference between the coefficients on years 
of required education and years of either under- or over-education.7 The return from years of over-
education is only three percentage points lower than that for years of required education. Under this 
specification, our worker with one year of education less than the required level for the occupation in 
which s/he is employed is now estimated to receive only 2% higher wages than if s/he were correctly 
matched: 6% higher wages for the additional year of required education less 4% for his/her year of 
under-education. 
Once the workers’ levels of education relative to their occupational norm are taken into account, 
the estimated gender wage gap actually increases. The standard wage equation indicates that males 
receive a wage premium of 11%. The ORU approach suggests a male wage premium of 14%, and the 
figure of 11% lies well outside the normal confidence intervals for the ORU estimate. In short, none 
of the gender wage gap can be explained by females being more likely to be over-educated or to be 
working in occupations for which they are under-educated. This is explored further in the robustness 
tests reported in the following section. Voon and Miller (2005) also report a greater standardised 
female wage disadvantage in their ORU model than in the conventional Mincerian model of wage 
determination. 
                                                   
6 By way of comparison, random-effects and fixed-effects estimation of the conventional Mincer wage equation 
(Model 1) result in estimates of the return from years of education of 7% and 4%, respectively. 
7 The Hausman test statistic is highly significant, suggesting that the fixed-effects model is the more appropriate 
specification for the ORU models. 
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From a methodological perspective, it is interesting to note that the findings are remarkably 
insensitive to whether or not the reference level of education is defined at the ANZSCO8 major 
occupational category (eight categories) or the more disaggregated two-digit level (43 applicable 
categories9). Table 7 reports the corresponding coefficients on the education variables when the 
reference level and years of over-education and under-education are defined only at the major 
occupational level. None of the estimates differs by more than one percentage point from those 
reported in table 6. 
Table 7 Wage equation estimates, HILDA 2001–08, with reference level, years of over-education, 
and years of under-education defined at major occupational categories 
Variable Standard wage 
equation 









 Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|t| 






      
Required    0.12 0.000 0.09 0.000 0.06 0.000 
Over-education   0.06 0.000 0.06 0.000 0.04 0.000 
Under-education   -0.05 0.000 -0.06 0.000 -0.04 0.000 
Notes: All models estimated in STATA using XTREG with robust standard errors. Clustering is at the level of the individual. 
In terms of these findings, most interest lies in the OLS model and the fixed-effects model, which is 
favoured by the Hausman test over the random-effects model. The advantage of the fixed-effects 
model is that it can take account of any time-invariant fixed effects that might be associated with 
omitted variables bias in the OLS model. The disadvantages of the fixed-effects model include that 
the estimates will also be inconsistent if these individual specific effects are in fact time-varying. As 
Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011, p.26) point out: 
Job changes can however be preceded, accompanied or followed by many other changes that are 
unobserved and affect wages. In such cases the strict exogeneity assumption that is necessary for 
the fixed effects estimates to be consistent fails. 
A further potential disadvantage of the fixed-effects estimator is that it relies on changes in 
education-occupation match/mismatch status for identification. Table 5 shows that this support for 
the model comes from around 10% of the sample. Finally, measurement error is often viewed as being 
of greater importance in the fixed-effects specification. For these reasons, we focus in the following 
section on the results from the random-effects estimator. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the payoff from actual years of education, from years of 
required education, and from years of surplus education are all approximately halved under the fixed-
effects specification.10 Research into the heterogeneity in the return from education has shown that it 
is related to factors such as school quality, and that the factors associated with higher returns are 
also typically associated with higher levels of education. The additive influences of these fixed effects 
                                                   
8 ANZSCO = Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations. 
9 Recall that employees in the two-digit ‘not fully defined’ categories were not included. 
10 The earnings advantage of an under-educated worker compared with a worker with the same actual years of schooling 
who is correctly matched to the requirements of his occupation is 2% under the fixed-effects estimation (2 = 6 – 4) and 
8% under the OLS model (8 = 12 – 4). This lends support to the earlier argument that this earnings advantage was due 
to under-educated workers being relatively well endowed with unobservables linked to favourable earnings outcomes. 
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are accommodated in the fixed-effects model. It would appear, therefore, that their relative 
importance is the same across the three coefficients noted above. 
The most important conclusion, however, is that, regardless of the set of estimates used, the fixed 
effects or the ordinary least squares, the same basic pattern arises. In other words, the relative 
magnitudes of the earnings effects associated with over-education, correctly matched education, and 
under-education reported in the literature are not distorted by the fixed effects that can be 
accommodated via the use of longitudinal data. Similarly, the policy findings, which are based largely 
on these relativities across the various payoffs rather than on absolute magnitudes, will not be 
sensitive to the particular method of estimation employed. 
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Credentialism versus over-education 
Human capital theory assumes that education increases an individual’s productivity, with likely 
synergies between education, experience and the use of technology and capital. Hence more 
education results in an individual commanding a higher wage in the labour market. Some models of 
wage determination in the labour market depart from this notion that wages are linked to individuals’ 
productivity levels, arguing instead that the wage distribution is determined by the distribution of 
available jobs in the labour market rather than the distribution of workers’ skills. Two such models 
are the screening hypothesis and Thurow’s job competition (or job queuing) model. The screening 
hypothesis suggests that the achievement of higher levels of education merely signals the pre-existing 
abilities of individuals, which employers then use as a means to allocate potential workers to 
available jobs (see Layard & Psacharopoulos 1974 for an early discussion). Thurow (1975) argued that 
a substantial proportion of workplace skills are accumulated on the job, and that the market is not so 
much one of competition on the basis of existing productivity but of allocation to training slots. 
Employers select applicants from the queue of potential workers based on the perceived cost of their 
training, which is influenced by the workers’ level of education. Educational attainment hence affects 
the worker’s position in the queue, but Thurow saw wages as attached to the job and determined by 
the power balance and sense of justice between workers and firms. 
Both the screening hypothesis and Thurow’s job competition model provide a possible theoretical basis 
for the empirical findings from the ORU approach. As McGuinness (2006, p.392) notes, Thurow’s model 
predicts that returns from education above that required to gain entry to the job will be zero. 
Undoubtedly, elements of both theories are at work in the real labour market, and their relative 
importance in explaining wage distributions is an empirical issue. The first part of this section uses 
variation in educational attainment by age cohort as a proxy to test for a trend of credentialism in the 
Australian labour market, and whether or not this can account for the findings in the ORU approach. 
The second provides two tests of the robustness of the findings, by considering the role of occupational 
fixed effects and differences in the wage determination process between males and females. 
Credentialism  
The optimal level of education ‘required’ for jobs will change over time as a result of the underlying 
characteristics of the work undertaken, such as the technology used and the industrial structure. Such 
changes can create a ‘real’ increase in the educational requirement of jobs, but can also work in the 
other direction, as in the case of the de-skilling associated with automation in many manufacturing 
processes. Credentialism can be defined as a general increase in the level of education of workers 
that is unrelated to these underlying requirements of the jobs in which they are employed. It can 
arise through workers using educational attainment to compete with each other for better jobs in the 
knowledge that employers use this as an imperfect signal of ability or lower training costs. 
Other than through the resource-intensive process of detailed job-content analysis, it is difficult to 
assess the proportion of change in the average level of education in an occupation that could be 
attributed to ‘genuine’ changes in the nature of the work done and the proportion that could be 
attributed to pure ‘credentialism’. As an admittedly imperfect indicator of trends in credentialism, 
differences in levels of educational attainment by age cohort are used. The rationale is that the 
higher levels of education accumulated by younger Australians represent a general increase in 
education levels rather than a response to the requirements of specific jobs. If this is the case, then 
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we would expect to observe a negligible earnings return from the extra years of education that the 
younger cohorts have relative to the older cohorts. However, where the extra years of schooling are 
associated with the development of productive skills (reading, numeracy), which enhance the 
worker’s value in the workplace, then we would expect to see an earnings return to the cohort 
effects similar to that documented above for years of surplus education. In this situation, the workers 
would get a modest return from the skills learned at school, but they would not get the high return 
associated with a greater likelihood of entering an occupation in which a higher level of skills is 
needed. This is simply because the occupational requirements of jobs have not really changed. 
Table 8 shows the average number of years of education accrued by age cohort for all persons, as 
derived from the 2006 census. 
Table 8 Average years of education by age cohort: 2006 census 
 School Non-school 
qualifications 
Total 
15–19 years 10.66 0.06 10.72 
20–24 years 11.50 0.85 12.35 
25–29 years 11.46 1.48 12.94 
30–34 years 11.36 1.48 12.84 
35–39 years 11.12 1.35 12.47 
40–44 years 10.93 1.25 12.18 
45–49 years 10.85 1.24 12.10 
50–54 years 10.72 1.20 11.92 
55–59 years 10.47 1.05 11.52 
60–64 years 10.24 0.90 11.14 
65–69 years 10.00 0.75 10.74 
Ignoring the 15 to 19-year-old cohort, of which many would have still been attending school, it is 
clear that the average number of years of schooling completed falls off steadily for older cohorts, 
reflecting a trend of increasing school retention over time. Similarly, for the cohorts older than 20—24 
years, the average number of years of post-school education completed falls with age, suggesting an 
upward trend over time. It seems unlikely that these trends are due to the changing occupational 
composition of the labour force, such as a decrease in the proportion of labouring and related 
unskilled jobs, since, as figure 1 demonstrates, the trend of rising accumulated education applies in 
all occupations. Likewise, Karmel (2011) concludes from his analysis of the employment and 
qualifications data in the 1996 and 2006 censuses that one result of the large increase in persons with 
qualifications in Australia ‘is that individuals with a certain level of qualification are being pushed 
toward less skilled occupations than were their peers from earlier cohorts’ (Karmel 2011, p.82). 
The important implication of these pictures is that it seems likely that what the previous literature, 
and our own previous section, has labelled ‘over-education’ and ‘under-education’ will partly be a 
cohort effect, whereby older workers are more likely to be classified as under-educated and younger 
workers classified as over-educated due simply to the norms in educational attainment that applied at 
the time of their formative years. 
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To incorporate this into the wage equations, the differences in years of education across cohorts will 
be used as a proxy for credentialism. This is consistent with the view articulated in the introductory 
chapter that credentialism is synonymous with an unnecessary increase over time in the education 
standards for jobs. With this definition of the cohort or credentialism effect, each individual’s years 
of schooling can be decomposed into an occupation reference level, the deviation from that level 
within the occupation associated with the individual’s age cohort, and the level of over- or under-
education relative to that cohort. The census data are again used to calculate a reference level of 
education for each of the major occupations. The ‘required’ level of education for each one-digit 
occupation is taken to be the mean years of education for persons employed in that occupation and 
aged 50—54 years. Divergences from that benchmark by age cohort are taken as a proxy for 
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schooling, are assessed as having positive years of schooling, which are, under this definition, pure 










     (Equation 4) 
where 

 represents the mean of years of education for employed persons aged 50—54 in 
individual i’s occupation, taken from the 2006 census; 

 represents the average level of education of 
individual i’s own cohort (in five-year intervals) and occupation; and  is the individual’s own 
accumulated years of education. 
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iRii SSCSXY µγγγγβα ++++++= ..ln    (Equation 5) 
Note that for this part of the analysis SU, SO, C and SR are defined at the major (one-digit) occupation 
level, rather than at the two-digit level due to the intensive data extraction and computation 
required to generate the reference levels of education for each two-digit occupation and age group. 
Tests of the sensitivity of estimates to the level of occupational disaggregation noted in the previous 
section suggest that this should not have any major bearing on the results. 
As discussed above, if the skills that are valued in the labour market are only learned on the job, the 
years of education above the level needed to gain entry into a job will be associated with a zero 
earnings return. Hence, under this extreme, we would expect γC = γO = 0. However, where the skills 
learned at school have value in the workplace, we would expect γC = γO ≠ 0. There is no reason to 
expect the effect of years of over-education within a cohort (γO) to differ from that of the cohort or 
credentialism component of years of schooling (γC), as both represent the same skills learned at 
school that are not matched to the requirements of the job. However, it is expected that γC = γO < γR. 
In the usual interpretation of the coefficients of the ORU model, the impact of a year of over-
education (γO) records the impact on earnings of the skills learned at school, and the difference 
between this return and the return from years of required education (γR) records the impact of 
mobility to an occupation where the higher level of education is needed. Provided that the inter-
occupational mobility is rewarded, and all the empirical literature suggests that it is, it is expected 
that γO < γR. Similarly, as this inter-occupational mobility component is not a characteristic of the 
years of schooling that represent credentialism, it is expected that γC < γR.  
For the estimation, the sample used is again the pooled data from waves 1 to 8 of HILDA. It is now 
restricted to persons aged 25 and over, given that the average level of education of a cohort is largely 
unrealised until this age, as is apparent from table 8. The regression results reported in table 9 are 
for random-effects models. For the purposes of comparison, the initial model reported in table 9 is 
the random-effects estimation of the standard Mincer wage equation (Equation 1), and it implies an 
increase in real wages of 7.2% for each year of education. Model 2 represents the corresponding 
‘standard’ ORU model, with education decomposed into the three components of SU, SO and SR. This 
reveals a slightly higher return from years of required education (9.6%), and returns from years of 
under- and over-education of around 6%, consistent with results reported above (table 6, Model 3). 
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Model 3 in table 9 reports the results of fitting Equation 5, now incorporating the cohort effect. The 
estimated effect of each additional year of education associated with the cohort effect is to raise 
earnings by 5.7%, which is very similar to, and not statistically different from, that for over-
education. It is possible that some of the cohort effect using this approach will be obscured by the 
inclusion of the dummy variables capturing age in ten-year cohorts. Note that the age dummies relate 
to the individuals’ contemporaneous age at the time of the survey, and hence many individuals will be 
observed to move from one age group to the next over the eight-year period of the survey. In 
contrast, their occupation-specific and cohort-specific years of education are based on their age at 
the time of the 2006 census and, hence, time-invariant unless a change in occupation occurs. So while 
there will be some variation in the cohort effect on education, which is independent of age effects, 
the models reported in table 9 were also estimated without the age dummies. The results relating to 
the education-related variables are not sensitive to the inclusion of the age variables. 
That additional years of education associated with the cohort effect are similarly associated with a 
lower return from education, as observed for years of over-education, is suggestive of a degree of 
‘credentialism’ associated with growing education levels over time. However, the positive and 
significant return from years of education associated with the cohort effect means that we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that such increases in average education levels do reflect higher productivity. 
Most importantly, the estimates from required, over-education and under-education are only 
marginally affected. The basic story, of lower returns from years of over-education relative to years 
of required education, and a net benefit of securing a job in an occupation for which one is under-
educated, remains the same. It seems, therefore, that the typical findings from the ORU approach are 
not simply an artefact of the higher average years of education accumulated by younger workers 
relative to older workers. 
In the ORU model, the comparatively high return from years of required education is a payoff to two 
factors: the acquisition of the educational qualification; and the job mobility to where this higher 
level of education is typical. By comparison, the payoff from a year of education that is surplus to the 
usual requirements of the worker’s occupation is a payoff simply from the acquisition of the 
qualification. Thus, the difference between the payoffs from the required years of education and the 
years of over-education represents the payoff from job mobility to an occupation where the higher 
level of education is a match to the job requirements. 
From this perspective, the similarity of the estimated impacts for the cohort effect and the years of 
over-education suggest that the increase in the average level of education over time has played a 
very minor role in the allocation of people across jobs. This is what one might expect if it is a general 
increase in education, rather than the result of increasing skill requirements in certain occupations. 
There is, however, the same monetary benefit from credentialism over time as there is to surplus 
education at a point in time. Presumably, they are part of the same upward creep in educational 
attainment that has characterised Australia and most Western countries over the past 100 years. 
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Table 9 Wage equation estimates, random effects, HILDA 2001–08, persons aged 25–64 
Variable Standard wage 
equation 
Over- and under-education models  
  
(Model 1) 
Standard ORU model 
(Model 2) 
With cohort effects 
(Model 3) 
 Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. P>|z| 
Intercept 1.621 0.000 1.319 0.000 1.387 0.000 
Wave 0.017 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.018 0.000 















35–44 —  —  —  
45–54 -0.027 0.000 -0.028 0.000 -0.028 0.000 










Never married -0.069 0.000 -0.069 0.000 -0.069 0.000 
Separated -0.019 0.004 -0.018 0.006 -0.018 0.006 
Widow -0.041 0.000 -0.039 0.000 -0.039 0.000 
Has disability -0.011 0.112 -0.011 0.111 -0.011 0.108 










2nd language &: 













English poor/none -0.197 0.000 -0.180 0.000 -0.181 0.000 
Work experience (yrs) 0.021 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.000 
Work exp. squared/1000 -0.280 0.000 -0.273 0.000 -0.274 0.000 






    
Required    0.096 0.000   
Required (mean aged 50–54)     0.092 0.000 
Cohort effect     0.057 0.000 
Over-education   0.060 0.000 0.058 0.000 
Under-education   -0.062 0.000 -0.063 0.000 
Obs 32 621  32 615  32 615  
Individuals 8 337  8 336  8 336  
Obs/indiv. 3.9  3.9  3.9  
R-squared 0.21  0.23  0.23  
R-sq: within 0.05  0.05  0.06  
between 0.21  0.23  0.23  
Wald chi2 2 695 0.000 3 048 0.000 3 076 0.000 
Notes: All models estimated in STATA using XTREG with robust standard errors. Clustering is at the level of the individual. 
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Tests of robustness 
This section reports the results of two tests of the robustness of the findings discussed above. In the 
first instance the estimating equation is augmented with dummy variables for occupation. Wages 
could vary across occupations if there are labour market imbalances or compensating differentials. As 
the reference years of education are defined using the occupation of employment, it is possible that 
variation in the reference years reflects these more basic determinants of wages (that is, labour 
market imbalances, compensating differentials) rather than the skill requirements of jobs. The second 
test of robustness investigates whether or not the findings are consistent for males and females. In 
each case the sample for estimation is restricted to persons aged 24—64 years, as above. 
Inclusion of dummy variables for occupation 
The three wage equations reported in table 10 — random-effects estimates of the standard Mincer 
model, the standard ‘ORU’ model, and the ORU/cohort model — correspond with the models reported 
in table 9 but with dummy variables included for the worker’s major occupation (at the one-digit 
level). Professionals, as the most numerous group, comprise the omitted category. Note that the 
variables for the reference levels of education in the ORU models (‘required’ years of education in 
the standard model and ‘required — mean aged 50—54’ in the ORU/cohort model) cannot be included 
due to collinearity with occupation dummies. 
The introduction of these controls for occupation into the Mincer model results in a minor reduction in 
the estimated return from each year of education, from 7.2% to the 5.9% reported in Model 1. The 
coefficients on the occupation dummies can be interpreted as wage premiums associated with 
employment in that occupation relative to being employed as a professional. All occupations are 
estimated to be associated with lower hourly wages than those earned by professionals: 2.0% lower 
for managers, the next most highly paid; and 16.1% lower for labourers, the lowest paid. 
As expected, these inter-occupational wage differentials are accentuated in Models 2 and 3, as the 
occupational dummies now capture differences in the reference levels of education. Under this 
specification, labourers are estimated to earn around 40% less than professionals. Thus there are 
relatively high wages predicted from the ORU model for workers in the high-status occupations, such 
as professionals and managers, compared with that which can be accounted for by the high mean 
levels of education in those occupations. This suggests that much of the inter-occupational wage 
structure typically reported in the literature and which presents the professional and managerial 
occupations as high paid, is more correctly associated with differences across occupations in job 
requirements. 
However, the main finding here is that the pattern in the estimated ORU wage effects and the cohort 
effect are essentially the same as reported previously, which suggests that this pattern is not driven 
by the characteristics of the occupations other than the educational requirements as measured in the 
ORU model. The estimated returns from years of over-education remain at around 6% in each case, 
and from under-education at around -6%. The estimated return from years of education associated 
with the cohort effect is slightly larger, at 7.2% (Model 3), but the estimate for years of over-
education remains well within the 95% confidence interval of [0.04:0.10] for the cohort effect. That 
is, the findings are robust to the control for the one-digit level of occupations. 
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Table 10 Wage equation estimates, random effects with occupation dummies, HILDA 2001—08, 
persons aged 25–64 






 Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. P>|z| 
Intercept 1.864 0.000 2.735 0.000 2.739 0.000 
Wave 0.018 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.017 0.000 















 35–44 —  —  —  
 45–54 -0.027 0.000 -0.027 0.000 -0.026 0.001 










 Never married -0.069 0.000 -0.069 0.000 -0.069 0.000 
 Separated -0.018 0.007 -0.018 0.006 -0.018 0.007 
 Widow -0.038 0.000 -0.038 0.000 -0.038 0.000 
Has disability -0.011 0.096 -0.011 0.104 -0.011 0.102 
Job is part-time 0.068 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.068 0.000 
English 1st language —  —  —  
English 2nd language &: 













 English poor/none -0.177 0.000 -0.176 0.000 -0.175 0.000 
Work experience (yrs) 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.020 0.000 















 Professionals —  —  —  
 Technicians and trades -0.071 0.000 -0.242 0.000 -0.267 0.000 
 Community, personal services -0.134 0.000 -0.282 0.000 -0.324 0.000 
 Clerical, administrative -0.073 0.000 -0.219 0.000 -0.260 0.000 
 Sales workers -0.135 0.000 -0.310 0.000 -0.349 0.000 
 Machinery operators, drivers -0.110 0.000 -0.331 0.000 -0.360 0.000 
 Labourers -0.161 0.000 -0.381 0.000 -0.415 0.000 






    
 Cohort effect      0.072 0.000 
 Over-education   0.056 0.000 0.055 0.000 
 Under-education   -0.063 0.000 -0.064 0.000 
Obs 32 621  32 616  32 615  
Individuals 8 337  8 337  8 336  
Obs/indiv. 3.9  3.9  3.9  
R-squared 0.24  0.24  0.24  
R-sq: within 0.06  0.06  0.06  
 between 0.24  0.24  0.24  
Wald chi2 3 211 0.000 3 210 0.000 3 222 0.000 
Notes: All models estimated in STATA using XTREG with robust standard errors. Clustering is at the level of the 
individual. 
Estimates by gender 
As the second test of robustness, table 11 reports separate models by gender. For comparison 
purposes the random-effects estimates for the standard Mincer model are reported (Models 1 and 3) 
and for the ORU models incorporating the cohort effect (Models 2 and 4). Some differences in the 
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estimates by gender are that men experienced faster real wage growth from 2001 to 2008, possibly 
due to the boom in the male-dominated mining sector during that period; males experience a greater 
fall-off in earnings with age; and married males receive a higher wage premium over their unmarried 
counterparts than is the case for women, possibly due to a division of labour among couples, in which 
the woman specialises in household production, freeing up time for the male to specialise in market 
production (see Gray 1997). 
Turning to the education variables, the results of the Mincer models suggest no difference in returns 
from years of actual education between males (7.1%) and females (7.3%) aged 25 to 64 years. Using 
the ORU model, augmented by cohort effects, the results are again broadly similar for males and 
females with respect to under-education, while females are estimated to receive a marginally higher 
return from years of required education. Some differences do emerge in the relative effects of over-
education and the cohort effect. For females the return from years of education associated with the 
cohort effect is slightly larger, but not statistically different from, the return from years of over-
education, as was observed for the full sample. For males, in contrast, the cohort effect is markedly 
smaller and not significantly different from zero. 
These results essentially provide information on the impacts on earnings of the vertical (in terms of 
chronological age) and horizontal dimensions of surplus years of schooling. The vertical dimension is 
the credentialism or cohort effect. The horizontal dimension refers to the value of years of surplus 
schooling within a cohort. The results indicate that the vertical dimension of the surplus schooling has 
value for females, but not for males. The horizontal dimension has modest value for both males and 
females. 
The fact that the vertical dimension has value for females but not for males could indicate that there 
is a signalling role for the extra years of schooling for females but not for males.11 The 1970s was the 
labour market entrance decade for the 50—54 year olds, who are used to establish the reference level 
for education. Since then, an increasing proportion of females have been entering the labour market 
and this has included movement into non-traditional female jobs. Therefore, within the broad 
categories of occupation used to establish the reference levels of education, extra years of schooling 
may have played a role in allocating women to higher paid and non-traditional occupations. In order 
to do this, they have needed to signal their innate abilities, or value, to employers. By contrast, 
males have continued to enter the same types of jobs over time, and hence signals of their worth by 
comparison with earlier cohorts have not been needed. This could also help to explain why the school 
and tertiary participation rates of females have increased relative to those of males since the 1970s.  
At the same time, there is a premium in any cohort to being able to demonstrate superior innate 
ability within any occupation, for both males and females. This is why there is the premium attached 
to years of surplus schooling within a specific cohort (the horizontal dimension). Alternatively, the 
return from the horizontal dimension of surplus schooling could reflect the value of skills learned at 
school. In this case we have three possibilities: 
 Additional years of schooling are used in job assignment at a point in time and this is why there is 
the relatively high return from years of required schooling. 
 Additional years of schooling for specific jobs where there have been no changes over time in 
labour market circumstances, particularly those on the demand-side of the market, such as in 
                                                   
11 As a first approximation, a year of schooling will impart similar skills for males and females (abstracting from 
differences in subjects studied, types of qualifications pursued), and hence it is difficult to envisage a situation where 
the different payoffs to the vertical dimension are linked to gender differences in skills learned at school. 
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traditional male jobs, are essentially redundant and hence are associated with a minimal impact 
on earnings. 
 Additional years of schooling within an occupation at any point in time can reflect either skills 
learned at school or the associated higher innate abilities of the better-educated, and hence are 
associated with higher earnings, albeit to a lower extent than where the additional years of 
schooling are associated with the inter-occupational movement to where the skills can be 
effectively utilised. 
Table 11 Mincer and ORU/cohort wage equation estimates by gender, random effects, HILDA  
2001–08, persons aged 25–64 
Variable Females Males 








 Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. Pr>|t| Coef. Pr>|t| 
Intercept 1.621 0.000 1.298 0.000 1.743 0.000 1.602 0.000 



















35–44 —  —  —  —  
45–54 -0.017 0.094 -0.015 0.145 -0.032 0.004 -0.034 0.002 












Never married -0.045 0.001 -0.046 0.001 -0.080 0.000 -0.079 0.000 
Separated 0.001 0.885 0.002 0.810 -0.036 0.000 -0.035 0.000 
Widow -0.016 0.222 -0.014 0.268 -0.064 0.001 -0.063 0.002 
Has disability 0.001 0.956 0.001 0.941 -0.020 0.018 -0.020 0.017 












2nd language &: 
English good/v. good 
-0.019 0.198 -0.008 0.563 -0.060 0.000 -0.057 0.000 
English poor/none -0.256 0.000 -0.227 0.000 -0.152 0.000 -0.145 0.000 
Work experience (yrs) 0.021 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.023 0.000 
Work exp. squared/1000 -0.313 0.000 -0.295 0.000 -0.329 0.000 -0.332 0.000 











Required (aged 50–54)   0.099 0.000   0.085 0.000 
Cohort effect   0.077 0.000   0.033 0.131 
Over-education   0.053 0.000   0.063 0.000 
Under-education   -0.061 0.000   -0.062 0.000 
Obs 15 883  15 883  16 738  16 732  
Individuals 4 156  4 156  4 181  4 180  
Obs/indiv. 3.8  3.8  4.0  4.0  
R-squared 0.20  0.23  0.18  0.20  
R-sq: within 0.04  0.05  0.07  0.07  
between 0.21  0.24  0.18  0.19  
Wald chi2 1 428 0.000 1 852 0.000 1 260 0.000 1 360 0.000 
Notes: All models estimated in STATA using XTREG with robust standard errors. Clustering is at the level of the individual. 
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Decomposition of the gender wage gap incorporating the cohort effect 
The contribution of the differences in returns from under-education, over-education and the cohort 
effect to the gender wage gap can further be examined using a standard decomposition. Econometric 
studies of the determinants of earnings have consistently identified an earnings premium associated 
with being male. As is well known, women earn lower wages on average than men, and only a portion 
of this difference can be accounted for by observable characteristics relating to productivity. Wage 
equations therefore return a positive and significant coefficient on a dummy variable for male gender 
(or negative coefficient on a female dummy), even when an extensive range of other control variables 
are included. This portion of the gender wage gap that cannot be accounted for by differences in the 
mean observable characteristics of men and women is termed the ‘unexplained’ component of the 
wage gap and is sometimes inferred to represent an indication of gender-based discrimination. 
Borland (1999) provides an overview of the relevant Australian literature. 
For the estimation sample included in the ORU/cohort wage equations reported above, the raw 
difference in mean wages by gender is a 17.7% higher hourly wage for men: $23.59 per hour as 
opposed to $20.04 per hour for women. The coefficient on the male dummy variable in Model 1 of 
table 9 implies a 15% wage premium for males after controlling for a relatively basic set of 
explanatory variables, and this persists even when occupational dummies are included (table 10), 
implying only around one-sixth of this wage gap is readily accounted for by differences in 
characteristics. The estimated male earnings premium increases marginally using the ORU approach 
(Models 2 and 3, table 9). The increase observed once individuals’ levels of over- and under-education 
are controlled for is to be expected, given that women are more likely to be under-educated and less 
likely to be over-educated than males, since these are characteristics associated with higher earnings. 
This was also observed by Voon and Miller (2005); however, the results reported in table 10 suggest 
this may be accounted for by occupation-specific effects. 
By way of comparison with another study based on HILDA data, Cobb-Clark and Tan (2011), using 
waves 1—6 and a sample restricted to persons aged 25—65 years, find an overall wage gap of 14.3%. 
The ‘unexplained’ gap remains at around 11.0% with the inclusion of controls for occupation and 
measures of individuals’ ‘non-cognitive skills’. Using cross-sectional data for full-time workers from 
the 1996 census, Voon and Miller (2005) estimate a 17.9% male wage premium from a standard Mincer 
wage equation, and a 20.6% premium from the ORU model. 
Following the method proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), the difference in the mean rates 
of pay between males and females can be decomposed into components attributable to differences in 
the means of observable characteristics for men and women, and differences in the returns from 














i XY µβα ++=ln    (Equation 7) 
Once the right-hand-side parameters for these equations have been estimated, differences in mean 
hourly wages of males and females can be decomposed in either of the following ways: 
 (Equation 7a) 
  (Equation 7b) 
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The decomposition given in Equation 7a assumes that the coefficients from the wage equation 
estimated for men are the non-discriminatory norm at which the characteristics for both males and 
females are evaluated. The alternative decomposition set out in Equation 7b takes the estimated 
coefficients for women as the non-discriminatory benchmark. Here we follow Voon and Miller (2005) 
in reporting the average of the results from these two approaches, thus enabling a more direct 
comparison with their results from a comparable decomposition using 1996 census data. 
The decomposition exercise set out above has previously been used to investigate whether the added 
information contained in the ORU approach can explain more of the gender wage gap than the 
standard Mincer wage equations (Voon & Miller 2005). It is now possible to also account for the cohort 
effect based upon the results reported in table 11, and the results of this decomposition analysis are 
presented in table 12. In fact, both specifications suggest that gender differences in observable 
characteristics should lead to higher wages for women — 1.7% higher under the Mincer model and 2.7% 
under the ORU/cohort model — and thus account for none of the wage gap at all. The main effects 
here are the higher proportion of women working part-time, which carries a positive wage premium, 
and the education variables. The decomposition suggests that the higher average years of actual 
education ‘should’ contribute a 1.6% higher wage for women on average. The standard ORU variables 
have a slightly larger effect: the sum of the effects of the higher proportion of women who are under-
educated and correctly matched and the lower proportion who are over-educated is to reduce the 
explained gap by 2.2 percentage points. The estimated contribution of the cohort effect, however, is 
inconsequential. These variables thus lead to a higher unexplained wage gap under the ORU/cohort 
model. The constant term and females’ lower returns from years of work experience are the main 
drivers of the ‘unexplained’ component. 
Table 12 Decomposition of gender wage gap: Mincer and ORU models  




Explained   
Education variables   
Actual years of education -0.016 — 
Cohort effect — -0.001 
ORU variables — -0.022 
Other observables -0.001 -0.004 
Total explained -0.017 -0.027 
Unexplained 0.157 0.165 
Although Voon and Miller (2005) find a substantially larger gender wage gap among full-time workers 
than is observed here for all workers, their findings are largely confirmed, in that accounting for the 
incidence of over-education and under-education cannot explain the gender wage differential 
observed in the standard Mincer models. Indeed, it exacerbates the unexplained component of the 
wage differential. 
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Conclusions 
When compared with the conventional Mincer wage equation, the ORU approach offers a potentially 
richer model of wage determination. While the Mincer model typically considers only supply-side 
factors, such as the educational endowments of the workforce, the ORU approach incorporates both 
the supply and the demand sides of the labour market. It potentially makes allowance for the 
possibility that workers have endowments in excess of those required by employers, or that in times 
of high demand employers will appoint workers to positions with less education than would normally 
be required; it also allows for a less-than-perfect matching process between the supply and demand 
sides. Evidence of significantly lower returns from over-education relative to the returns from 
required education would have important policy implications for the optimal level of investment in 
education and in improving the efficiency of the matching processes in the labour market. 
This paper has sought to present further evidence on the intricacies of the returns from education in 
the Australian labour market through new applications of the ORU approach, making use of Australian 
datasets to test the robustness of the standard findings from ORU models when confronted by several 
conceptual challenges. The 2006 census data, covering almost the full population of Australian 
employees, allows the mean level of education by occupation to be identified with a degree of 
certainty and at a fine level of disaggregation — in this study for 43 two-digit occupations. Combining 
this information with data from the HILDA Survey allows the ORU model to be estimated — and tested 
by — the additional information provided by a large longitudinal panel spanning eight years. 
The results confirm the key findings from the ORU approach: relative to the return from years of 
actual education estimated in a conventional Mincer model, the estimated returns from years of 
required education are substantially higher, and the returns from years of over-education are 
substantially lower than the returns from years of required education. Workers employed in 
occupations for which they are under-educated receive, on average, a positive wage premium over 
their similarly educated but correctly matched counterparts, because the return from years of 
required education is greater than the penalty associated with years of under-education. Using a 
random-effects panel model, the estimated return from each year of required education is 10%, from 
years of over-education 5%, and from years of under-education minus 6%. A comparable Mincer 
equation shows a return from years of actual education of 7%. 
However, it appears that much of the difference between the returns from years of required 
education relative to both over- and under-education can be attributed to fixed individual effects, 
rather than to educational mismatch per se. These findings are consistent with two other studies of 
which we are aware that have applied the ORU approach to panel data for Germany (Bauer 2002) and 
the US (Tsai 2010).Other studies using the HILDA data and panel techniques to assess the wage effects 
of overskilling confirm the importance of fixed effects, although they do not strictly follow the ORU 
approach (Mavromaras et al. 2010). The pattern of differences in the estimated returns from actual 
years of education, years of required education, years of surplus education, and from years of under-
education was the same under the various methods of estimation. As many of the policy conclusions 
that flow from research using the ORU model are based on the relative rather than the absolute 
magnitudes of returns, the robustness of the pattern here is reassuring. 
In addition to testing whether previous findings are robust to estimation with panel data, an important 
conceptual challenge to the ORU approach has been explored: is what is measured as over-education 
simply a manifestation of credentialism — a general increase in the level of education of workers over 
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time that is unrelated to the underlying requirements of the jobs in which they are employed? The 
average number of years of both schooling and post-school education that young people complete has 
continually increased over time. Data from the 2006 census show that 25 to 29-year-olds had 
completed, on average, 1.2 more years of schooling and 0.6 of a year more post-school education than 
60 to 64-year-olds. This rising tide of credentialism will mean that, within occupations, younger people 
will tend to be classified as over-educated and older workers as under-educated. 
By taking cohort effects on educational attainment as a proxy for credentialism, it is possible to 
extend the ORU approach by distinguishing between the over- or under-education associated with 
credentialism and the over- or under-education that arises independently of cohort effects. Strong 
evidence of credentialism is identified in the sense that years of education associated with the cohort 
effect are found to provide a substantially lower return (around 5.7%) than years of required 
education (9.2%). However, accounting for credentialism in this way has little impact on the 
estimates for other ORU variables. It can be concluded that the findings from the ORU approach do 
not simply reflect credentialism; rather, credentialism is just one of the sources of over-education 
captured in the ORU models. The fact that the estimated impact of years of education associated 
with credentialism is so similar to the impact of years of over-education (5.8%) suggests that the rise 
in educational attainment over time has not increased mobility to higher-paying occupations. Rather, 
the payoff is the same as returns from additional years of education within the one occupation. 
This is consistent with deadweight loss arising through individuals competing for jobs: while there may 
be inter-occupational gains for any one individual accruing more years of education, it is a zero-sum 
game (in terms of inter-occupational mobility) if all individuals accrue more education. However, a 
more nuanced picture arises when the effects of credentialism are investigated separately by gender. 
Trends in educational attainment have resulted in young women employees now possessing more 
years of education than their male counterparts, the reverse of the situation for the older cohorts. 
This rise in the general level of education for women does appear to have generated returns in excess 
of those from years of over-education, and thus to represent more than a within-occupation effect. 
Moreover, this gain in occupational mobility has come at the expense of males, who display a 
markedly lower return from rising general levels of educational attainment, consistent with the ‘zero-
sum game’ observed for the overall labour market. 
The findings from the ORU approach to estimation, including the incorporation of credentialism, were 
robust to two extensions to the analysis. First, the model was augmented with dummy variables for 
occupation of employment. Second, the model was estimated on separate samples of males and 
females. While the point estimates of the key parameters differ across these various estimations, in 
each instance the estimates support the central findings from the standard ORU model. The one 
potential exception relates to the differential results for the cohort effect for men and women, and 
this has an intuitively appealing explanation. These results, together with the similarity of the pattern 
in the estimated coefficients across the ordinary least squares, random-effects panel model and 
fixed-effects panel model suggest that a high degree of confidence can be attached to the policy 
recommendations. 
The key policy message from the results reported here — both the confirmation of the general 
findings of the ORU approach and those with respect to credentialism — is the large gain that could be 
potentially achieved through a better matching of workers’ actual educational attainment to job 
requirements. It is true that a year of over-education still offers a positive return in terms of higher 
hourly wages, in the general magnitude of 3—6%. Note, however, this is only the wage premium at a 
point in time. The full impact is lower if that year of education is at the expense of a year of work 
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experience and does not take into account the private direct costs associated with that education or 
the public costs associated with the provision of education. Promoting stronger links between industry 
and the school and VET systems, so that students engage with the workforce as early as possible, may 
help to better align workers’ educational attainment with the requirements of their occupational 
destinations, at least initially. Better matching can also be achieved through more intensive 
counselling in the education sector, and through minimising the effects of barriers to worker mobility, 
which can include location barriers such as poor public transport and the high costs of selling and 
buying residential property. 
The results relating to credentialism should at least offer a warning that the ongoing trend of 
increasing general educational attainment for young people needs to be monitored and critically 
assessed. However, this is the first study of which we are aware to estimate such an effect, and more 
empirical evidence is needed in this area. Devising alternative approaches to distinguishing 
credentialism from required education would offer an important contribution in this regard. Job 
content analyses for selected occupations where technological changes have had a significant impact 
upon job requirements over time or more general proxies for technological change that differentially 
impact upon the requirement of different occupations may provide possible sources of such measures. 
The difference between men and women in the estimated impact of credentialism suggests that 
further investigation of this outcome using a gender-specific measure may be worthwhile. This was 
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Appendices 
Table A1 Years of education by two-digit occupation and gender: means and standard deviations, 
2006 census 
 Male Female Persons 
 Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. 
Managers       
Managers, nfd 12.89 2.40 12.79 2.50 12.86 2.43 
Chief executives, general managers and legislators 13.51 2.47 13.76 2.49 13.56 2.47 
Farmers and farm managers 10.97 2.00 11.36 2.18 11.09 2.06 
Specialist managers 13.28 2.37 13.84 2.33 13.45 2.37 
Hospitality, retail and service managers 12.08 1.96 12.02 2.00 12.05 1.97 
Professionals       
Professionals, nfd 15.70 2.86 15.51 2.51 15.60 2.69 
Arts and media professionals 13.30 2.20 13.96 2.23 13.60 2.24 
Business, human resource and marketing professionals 14.23 2.08 14.14 2.08 14.19 2.08 
Design, engineering, science and transport professionals 14.76 2.21 15.07 2.06 14.84 2.17 
Education professionals 15.49 2.10 15.24 1.52 15.32 1.72 
Health professionals 15.60 2.00 14.77 1.67 14.98 1.80 
ICT professionals 14.49 1.93 14.42 2.03 14.47 1.95 
Legal, social and welfare professionals 15.24 1.85 15.11 1.89 15.17 1.87 
Technicians and trades workers       
Technicians and trades workers, nfd 11.86 1.63 12.24 2.05 11.88 1.65 
Engineering, ICT and science technicians 12.71 1.84 13.07 2.05 12.80 1.90 
Automotive and engineering trades workers 11.47 1.25 11.54 1.77 11.47 1.26 
Construction trades workers 11.29 1.33 11.26 1.80 11.29 1.33 
Electrotechnology and telecommunications trades workers 11.98 1.27 12.19 1.79 11.99 1.28 
Food trades workers 11.48 1.66 11.34 1.75 11.43 1.69 
Skilled animal and horticultural workers 11.36 1.69 11.91 1.76 11.51 1.72 
Other technicians and trades workers 11.60 1.53 11.73 1.55 11.65 1.54 
Community and personal service workers       
Community and personal service workers, nfd 12.49 2.52 12.65 2.23 12.61 2.31 
Health and welfare support workers 12.82 1.95 12.85 1.92 12.84 1.93 
Carers and aides 11.97 1.97 11.77 1.76 11.79 1.79 
Hospitality workers 12.14 1.63 11.70 1.63 11.83 1.64 
Protective service workers 12.18 1.75 12.61 1.93 12.26 1.79 
Sports and personal service workers 12.38 1.93 12.55 1.78 12.49 1.84 
Clerical and administrative workers       
Clerical and administrative workers, nfd 13.04 2.17 12.56 2.10 12.70 2.13 
Office managers and program administrators 13.36 2.23 12.52 2.10 12.75 2.17 
Personal assistants and secretaries 13.07 2.27 11.79 1.75 11.82 1.77 
General clerical workers 12.49 2.01 11.82 1.83 11.92 1.87 
Inquiry clerks and receptionists 12.64 1.86 11.85 1.70 11.96 1.75 
Numerical clerks 12.95 2.02 12.03 1.87 12.21 1.94 
Clerical and office support workers 11.63 1.86 11.71 1.94 11.67 1.90 
Other clerical and administrative workers 
 
12.17 1.94 12.36 1.98 12.27 1.96 
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 Male Female Persons 
 Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. 
Sales workers       
Sales workers, nfd 12.16 1.88 11.87 1.83 12.01 1.86 
Sales representatives and agents 12.21 1.87 12.26 1.92 12.23 1.89 
Sales assistants and salespersons 11.69 1.70 11.39 1.62 11.49 1.66 
Sales support workers 11.79 1.82 11.40 1.64 11.50 1.69 
Machinery operators and drivers       
Machinery operators and drivers, nfd 10.79 1.54 10.40 1.79 10.75 1.57 
Machine and stationary plant operators 10.96 1.63 10.91 1.94 10.95 1.69 
Mobile plant operators 10.59 1.47 11.14 1.62 10.61 1.48 
Road and rail drivers 10.80 1.71 10.89 1.64 10.80 1.71 
Storepersons 11.23 1.57 11.08 1.69 11.20 1.59 
Labourers       
Labourers, nfd 10.62 1.59 10.58 1.70 10.62 1.60 
Cleaners and laundry workers 11.03 1.96 10.56 1.75 10.74 1.85 
Construction and mining labourers 10.86 1.50 11.14 1.80 10.86 1.50 
Factory process workers 10.93 1.77 10.79 1.88 10.88 1.82 
Farm, forestry and garden workers 10.76 1.68 11.09 1.83 10.84 1.72 
Food preparation assistants 11.12 1.74 10.86 1.67 10.97 1.71 
Other labourers 11.08 1.66 11.01 1.67 11.06 1.67 
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Table A2 Employees under-educated, correctly matched and over-educated, by two-digit occupation 
(pooled sample), HILDA (%) 
 Females Males 
 Under- Matched Over- Under- Matched Over- 
Managers       
Chief executives, general managers and legislators 22.7 70.5 6.8 19.1 72.8 8.1 
Farmers and farm managers a. a. a. 7.4 82.8 9.8 
Specialist managers 12.6 61.6 25.8 18.2 59.9 21.9 
Hospitality, retail and service managers 22.6 64.1 13.2 13.1 68.4 18.4 
Professionals       
Arts and media professionals 7.5 72.2 20.3 15.6 76.3 8.1 
Business, human resource and marketing professionals 19.8 73.3 6.9 21.2 70.2 8.6 
Design, engineering, science and transport professionals 14.4 76.9 8.8 19.9 74.3 5.8 
Education professionals 14.0 83.3 2.6 17.1 72.5 10.4 
Health professionals 24.8 72.1 3.2 12.7 70.7 16.6 
ICT professionals 21.4 61.1 17.6 30.2 61.1 8.8 
Legal, social and welfare professionals 20.1 79.1 0.8 19.0 77.9 3.1 
Technicians and trades workers       
Engineering, ICT and science technicians 18.8 54.1 27.1 7.0 72.8 20.2 
Automotive and engineering trades workers a. a. a. 16.4 68.1 15.5 
Construction trades workers a. a. a. 12.2 76.9 10.9 
Electrotechnology and telecommunications trades workers a. a. a. 11.7 80.4 7.9 
Food trades workers 11.5 86.0 2.5 5.7 90.2 4.1 
Skilled animal and horticultural workers 8.6 58.1 33.3 11.3 79.9 8.8 
Other technicians and trades workers 9.3 74.8 15.9 23.5 63.0 13.6 
Community and personal service workers       
Health and welfare support workers 17.0 65.0 18.1 11.5 64.2 24.3 
Carers and aides 10.2 81.7 8.2 0.5 77.0 22.4 
Hospitality workers 21.6 64.6 13.8 12.8 71.9 15.3 
Protective service workers 12.7 70.9 16.4 13.6 81.5 4.9 
Sports and personal service workers 16.5 65.1 18.4 7.8 65.6 26.6 
Clerical and administrative workers       
Office managers and program administrators 20.1 56.4 23.5 8.6 56.4 35.0 
Personal assistants and secretaries 19.6 71.9 8.6 a. a. a. 
General clerical workers 19.3 68.3 12.4 13.1 67.0 19.9 
Inquiry clerks and receptionists 20.0 69.1 10.8 3.0 76.2 20.8 
Numerical clerks 17.7 70.6 11.7 5.5 71.8 22.7 
Clerical and office support workers 10.9 76.0 13.1 3.7 87.2 9.2 
Other clerical and administrative workers 14.5 63.7 21.8 20.0 70.7 9.3 
Sales workers       
Sales representatives and agents 15.5 75.0 9.5 11.0 70.4 18.5 
Sales assistants and salespersons 9.6 79.0 11.5 3.5 83.8 12.7 
Sales support workers 12.1 73.8 14.1 1.4 79.6 19.0 
Machinery operators and drivers       
Machine and stationary plant operators 12.5 79.8 7.7 19.9 73.2 6.9 
Mobile plant operators a. a. a. 19.2 73.7 7.0 
Road and rail drivers 5.9 88.2 5.9 17.0 76.3 6.7 
Storepersons 
 
a. a. a. 13.9 70.4 15.7 
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 Females Males 
 Under- Matched Over- Under- Matched Over- 
Labourers       
Cleaners and laundry workers 14.9 76.5 8.6 6.9 78.8 14.3 
Construction and mining labourers a. a. a. 20.2 70.0 9.9 
Factory process workers 25.1 64.5 10.3 14.2 73.6 12.3 
Farm, forestry and garden workers 10.6 62.5 26.9 16.2 70.0 13.9 
Food preparation assistants 14.4 73.2 12.3 6.6 77.6 15.8 
Other labourers 17.9 70.1 11.9 15.5 71.2 13.3 
Total 16.5 72.3 11.2 15.0 72.0 13.0 
Note: a. Percentages not reported where number of employees in the sample is less than 50. 
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